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What’s the Matter with
Being a Strategist (Now)?
CHARLES P. MOORE

A

merican strategic competence is in decline. Twenty years after victory
in the Cold War, a victory brought about by the shrewd use of state power and alliances while ably balancing international and domestic pressures,
the United States now is struggling to find the right balance of military force
and other forms of power in its current wars, while peering into an uncertain future. Commenting on American strategic competence, noted defense
analyst Barry D. Watts argues, “US performance in Iraq provides ample evidence that it has been declining for some time.”1 This line of thought typically asserts that American strategic competence reached its apex between
the victory in World War II; implementation of NSC 68, a 1950 report advocating ends, ways, and means of countering communism; and President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Solarium project, a 1953 evaluation of national security policy regarding the Soviet Union. Somewhere between the death of
Josef Stalin and the rise of an era of limited war, the United States lost its
strategic way.
Given the diverse nature of today’s threats, many observers look back
with nostalgia on the clarity of the Soviet threat and the quality of the strategic thinking and planning that countered it. Rash comparisons between
Cold War challenges—remembered as clearly identified, existential, and
countered with bipartisan political support—and today’s stew of pandemics, loose nuclear weapons, hackers, and undergoverned territories deserve
closer scrutiny. Despite stark differences between the eras, there may be
merit to the rising claim of strategic incompetence. From the Bay of Pigs
to Vietnam to the inconclusive ceasefire terms at the end of the 1991 Gulf
War, there is evidence that the strategic skill of the United States has been
found wanting.
If Watts is correct, that it is America’s strategic competence that demands repair, then perhaps the effort to slow the erosion has already begun.
A reversal of that trend is taking place, one that has gone unnoticed and
will likely remain underappreciated for years to come—the return of the
Army strategist. It would be ideal if this progress could be announced with
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the flamboyancy of a John Williams score in Star Wars: Return of the Jedi,
but in reality this reversal is subtle, bureaucratic, and over a decade old.
The US Army currently has more than 400 military strategists serving in the grades of captain to colonel, diligently assisting commanders from
division to combatant command level. Strategists occupy key positions
within the broader defense community, serving on the National Security
Council, Joint Staff, Army Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
recently at the Treasury and State Departments. In a number of ways, these
strategists owe their development, education, and assignments to a vision
articulated more than 20 years ago.
In 1989, General John R. Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander-in-Chief, US European Command at the time, argued
for the return of uniformed strategists in his article, “What’s the Matter
with Being a Strategist?” After succinctly defining the attributes of military
strategists, General Galvin suggested that key elements of their development included advanced schooling, operational experience, and lifelong development.2 His influential and timely argument helped stimulate a review
of the requirement for military strategists conducted by the Army’s Officer
Personnel Management System Task Force XXI/3 in the late 1990s. This
review resulted in the creation of the functional specialty supporting Army
strategists, technically recognized as Functional Area (FA) 59, Strategic
Plans and Policy officers.
Despite the number of strategists and the breadth of their assignments, this functional specialty is still a relatively recent development. Since
1999, the Army has gradually formalized the development of the specialty
and expanded the number of strategists. Portraying military strategists as a
recent innovation is, however, to a degree inaccurate.
The Army has always produced strategic thinkers and planners. Historical precedents include General Winfield Scott’s early Anaconda Plan
to strangle the Southern secessionists and ultimately the implementation of
General Ulysses S. Grant’s strategic plan to restore the Union at the close of
the Civil War.3 One might consider General John J. Pershing’s dogged insistence on creating and maintaining an autonomous American Expeditionary
Force and committing that force as an independent entity during World War
I, while at the same time balancing domestic and international concerns.4
A more recent example of strategic competency and expertise in
the US Army was Winston Churchill’s characterization of General George

Lieutenant Colonel Charles P. Moore is Director of the Basic Strategic Art Program
at the US Army War College and has been an Army strategist since 2002.



Parameters

C. Marshall as “the organizer of victory” in World War II.5 Aside from
Marshall’s singular strategic and organizational brilliance, he was a superb
manager of talent. Marshall recognized General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
abilities and appointed him as Chief of the War Plans Division in the War
Department, described by many as the command post for World War II.6 It
was here that Eisenhower, with the aid of a number of highly talented subordinates such as Leonard T. Gerow and Albert C. Wedemeyer, devised the
strategy for a global war encompassing the Pacific and European theaters
and eventually providing Marshall with “the first specific plan for a crossChannel invasion” of Europe.7 These officers played a critical role in developing and implementing military strategy in support of national objectives
facilitating Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman’s ability
to prosecute a successful global war. Army strategists were essential to Allied victory; their contributions reflected the zenith of American operational
and strategic art during this critical period in world history. Unfortunately,
this was an ascent that would too quickly decline.
Despite such a rich history, the role of military strategists diminished
following World War II, and this crucial capability atrophied. During the Cold
War, the role of civilian nuclear strategists increased; Congress reduced the
service departments’ responsibilities from global command in 1946 to simply
“organizing, training, and equipping” the force; and many senior uniformed
leaders spent the majority of their careers in tactical troop-leading assignments. Little time and limited resources were devoted to developing military
strategists. These factors and a number of others combined to diminish the
military strategist and erode America’s strategic competence.
Watts’s assessment of declining American strategic competence is
only one of many credible critiques. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., explained that the significant contributions of military strategists, after their
central role in strategy development and implementation during World War
II, yielded to “a general feeling that strategy was budget-driven and was primarily a function of resource allocation. The task of the Army, in their view,
was to design and procure material, arms, and equipment and to organize,
train, and equip soldiers for the Defense Establishment.”8 A more recent example affirms Summers’s characterization.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz assembled a team of scholars, Middle Eastern experts, and
analysts to help identify the underlying problems that allowed the attacks
and to develop a strategy to prevent others. Wolfowitz reportedly told an
associate, “The US government, especially the Pentagon, is incapable of
producing the kinds of ideas and strategy needed to deal with a crisis of the
magnitude of 9/11.”9 He began by asking a Washington, D.C., think tank
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Army strategists provide a strategic perspective on
complex problems and help create national and
regional strategic guidance.
to organize a weekend-long “bull session” analyzing the roots of terrorism.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense chose to outsource his strategy development, in stark contrast to the options available to Roosevelt and Truman.
While a full account of the decline of military strategists is beyond
the scope of this article, ample evidence exists to support the assertion that
the role of strategists has greatly diminished from the “organizers of victory”
to Wolfowitz’s actions. Nonetheless, we are ten years into a reversal of this
protracted trend. The reality is that Army strategists now serve in every major joint force and Army command. But what do these strategists actually
do in support of these organizations? Indeed, what precisely is meant by the
descriptor strategy?
Strategy and Strategist
A person could grow old collecting definitions of “strategy” and
“strategic.” Theorists have made careers of trying to define these terms and
explaining the inherent difficulties of matching strategy with political objectives. Definitions range from Colin Gray’s narrow view that strategy is
“the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy”10
to more inclusive definitions, such as Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley’s contention that strategy is “a process, a constant adaptation to shifting
conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.”11 Across this range of definitions is the recurring charge
that strategists have to comprehend both the political and military exigencies of a situation and provide the “bridge that relates military power to political purpose.”12 Given the dynamic and ambiguous nature of strategy and
the volatility of the global strategic environment, hoping for an occasional
strategic genius to arise is simply not an option. As Murray and Grimsley
suggest, a cadre of strategically educated and adept individuals capable of
coping with this uncertain environment is a necessity. Despite the inherent
difficulty in developing such a cadre, envisioning it is a bit easier.
In 1995, Major General Richard A. Chilcoat argued for an increased
focus on developing masters of the strategic art—in his words, officers
trained in the “orchestration of all the instruments of national power to yield
specific, well-defined end-states . . . [by using] the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action),
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and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.”13 He envisioned a functional separation of strategists into strategic
leaders, practitioners, and theoreticians. General Chilcoat further explained
the competencies and roles encompassing the strategic art:
The Strategic Leader provides vision and focus, capitalizes on command and peer leadership skills, and inspires others to think and act.
The Strategic Practitioner develops a deep understanding of all levels
of war and strategy and their interrelationships, develops and executes
strategic plans derived from interagency and joint guidance, employs
force and other dimensions of military power, and unifies military and
nonmilitary activities through command and peer leadership skills.
The Strategic Theorist studies the history of warfare, develops strategic concepts and theories, integrates them with the elements of national power and with the National Security Strategy and National
Military Strategy, and teaches or mentors the strategic art.14

Today’s strategists most closely resemble Chilcoat’s strategic practitioner, although some perform duties associated with the development of
concepts and doctrine, or serve as teachers and mentors (Chilcoat’s strategic
theorist). There is a key distinction between the visions of Galvin and Chilcoat, who envisioned officers capable of being strategists and commanders,
and the role played by the modern strategists. Army strategists are specialty
officers who will not aspire to becoming strategic leaders or commanding at
the senior level. Rather, they serve as staff officers in support of commanders. Recurring educational opportunities and operational assignments will in
all likelihood preclude them from commanding. Indeed, repeated strategiclevel assignments provide the cornerstone of their development as strategists
and set them apart from their contemporaries.
The Strategic Leader Division of the US Army Personnel Command
defines “strategic leaders” as colonels and general officers. For the purpose
of this article, military strategic leaders are limited to three- and four-star
officers. These officers comprise the strategic advisers and commanders of
major formations within the joint force. Army strategists, on the other hand,
form a core of skilled practitioners who support those strategic leaders with
a variety of activities.
The Strategist as Strategic Practitioner
Army strategists provide a strategic perspective on complex problems and help create national and regional strategic guidance. They are instrumental in the translation of that guidance into actionable plans at the
theater-strategic and operational levels of war. The Army defines these specialty officers as “warfighters who provide the Army with a highly trained
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cadre specializing in the development and implementation of national strategic plans and policies; theater strategy and campaign planning; and the
evolution of concepts and doctrine for employing military forces at the operational and strategic levels of warfare.”15 These functions warrant the
assignment of strategists to national military staffs (defined as the service
staffs, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense) as well as the staffs
of the combatant commands and subunified commands across the globe.
To satisfy General Chilcoat’s demand for strategists who acquire a
“deep understanding of all levels of war and strategy and their interrelationships,” the Army is developing specific attributes in its strategists. These
attributes are cited in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, which specifies the strategists’ ability to apply critical thought in a historically informed
and culturally perceptive manner. From such a strategic perspective, Army
strategists exploit opportunities and overcome challenges in support of the
joint force to achieve national objectives. According to the pamphlet, Army
strategists employ interdisciplinary problem-solving and assessment techniques that complement senior leader decision-making and appraisal; are experts at integrating Army capabilities with other services; and understand the
formal and informal processes for developing the national security strategy
and national military strategy, to include planning and budgeting systems.16
Properly developed by educational and operational experience, these
capabilities produce Army strategists with four specific competencies. They
can conduct or facilitate:
(1) Strategic Appraisal: Strategists build feedback mechanisms that
enable iterative reassessment and adjustment of plans in response to
adaptive adversaries . . . within the context of a coherent strategy.
(2) Strategic Planning: Strategists create and sustain actionable plans
or recommendations that translate operational and institutional means
into desired end-states, with emphasis on campaign planning and integration of joint capabilities within national and theater-level plans.
(3) Inter-service/Interagency Integration: Strategists provide nonpartisan approaches to develop synergistic and integrated solutions that
maximize team capabilities.
(4) Strategic Education: Strategists teach and develop curriculum to
support education in military theory, the strategic arts, concept and
doctrine development, and national security strategies and policies.17

These capabilities and associated competencies epitomize the Army’s
expectations of experienced strategists. Cynics may assert that this set of
specifications is just one more laundry list of ideal attributes, unlikely to be
developed in officers in times of war. Yet the resources and opportunities
to foster these skills have never been greater. Others argue that one cannot
become “proficient” in so many varied competencies. This view has merit
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but misses a central point: Strategists are not pursuing some idealized level
of proficiency in any one competency or ability; their central requirement
is to achieve sufficiency in multiple areas. In other words, Army strategists
are specialty officers who concentrate in the general application of strategy. The theater strategist writing operational war plans will benefit from assignments in Washington, D.C., on a national staff. National staff officers
conduct institutional planning with a focus on its effect in support of the
combatant commands. Being sufficiently competent in both arenas is the
goal, but there are others. If General Chilcoat successfully explains what
strategic practitioners ought to be, then General Galvin is equally as successful in explaining how they should be developed.
From Vision to Reality
General Galvin asked, “How do we get as broad a leavening of strategic thinkers as possible?”18 He asserted that the Army needs an “agenda of
action” to prepare uniformed strategists with appropriate schooling, experience, and lifelong self-development. His vision for how strategists should
be developed is largely realized in the Army’s current model. A deliberate
combination of military schooling, civilian education, and repeated operational assignments contributes to the formal development of Army strategists. Although each person develops uniquely, the functional area approach
collectively develops officers with the skills necessary to perform the four
specific competencies previously listed.
Formal Education
Army strategists are schooled and qualified through the US Army
War College’s Basic Strategic Art Program (BSAP). This effort is the result
of leveraging the best aspects of several different educational experiences as
it formulated the BSAP curriculum. In September 2001, the Army War College and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations
and Plans (Strategic Leadership Division) convened a workshop to determine the competencies and educational requirements for Army strategists.19
The conference provided an opportunity to identify the skills, knowledge,
and attributes of the functional area and to design a program of instruction
that supported those requirements. These deliberations culminated with the
implementation of the BSAP course.
The course introduces newly designated Army strategists to a strategic pedagogy and to the specific elements of the functional area that produce a foundation for progressive development. To this end, BSAP consists
of the following modules: strategic theory, strategic art, joint and Army sysWinter 2009-10
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Despite the number of strategists and the breadth
of their assignments, this functional specialty is
still a relatively recent development.

tems, national security decision-making, contemporary security challenges,
and joint and Army planning. By anticipating the long-term skills and attributes of strategists, BSAP establishes a foundation for continued learning.
Using the format of a graduate seminar, the course incorporates history, theory, exercises, guest lectures, and staff rides during its 14-week program to develop a “rich professional perspective on policy, strategy, and
doctrine.”20 The students capitalize on a guest speaker program that invites
distinguished historians, political scientists, authors, and senior leaders to enhance the student learning in a seminar environment. The course expanded
from a seven-student pilot program in 2003 to three 15-student sessions in
2008. It graduated its first civilian interagency participant in 2009; future
classes are scheduled to include interagency members in an effort to broaden the group’s pedagogical base. But BSAP is only one of many educational
opportunities available in the development of Army strategists.
Army strategists attend numerous service, joint, and international military schools to continue their development. Officers are required to meet the
Intermediate Level Education requirement but may also attend individual
command and staff colleges and other approved Joint Professional Military
Education institutions. Approximately 15 percent of Army strategists have
attended the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) with follow-on
assignments to division and corps planning staffs. A select few will attend
senior service colleges. Despite the array of schooling available, the centerpiece of education for strategists is attendance at civilian universities.
Virtually all Army strategists have the opportunity to attend civilian
institutions to acquire a master’s degree. These programs vary in length from
12 to 24 months depending on the degree being pursued. Funding for this
program comes from various sources. No matter what program the officers
may choose, degree completion is their only requirement while enrolled. To
build a diverse cadre of strategists, the course of study ranges from political
science and international affairs to history and economics. The Army also
supports strategists attending the John F. Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University and the School of Advanced International Studies at
Johns Hopkins University. A select number of Army strategists later return
to various universities and pursue doctoral degrees. Nearly half of each co-
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hort will graduate from an elite university, and every participant receives the
opportunity for a broad, liberal education at a civilian university. The Army
invests heavily in the education of its strategists. Strategic education, however, without practical application is of little value.
Unit Experience
As General Galvin suggested, it is experience at the unit level that
provides for the critical development of the officer. According to Galvin,
“Rarely can the strategist in uniform gain a complete understanding of military force in some theoretical way; an officer absorbs much of what he
knows in the practical, daily world of military units [in] the field.”21 The experience gained at the operational level may not be readily recognizable to
most soldiers. It may consist of assignments to national strategic staffs, geographic and functional combatant commands, and theater armies, as well
as duty with Army corps and divisions. It also includes assignments to other agencies of the US government, multinational staffs, and institutions of
higher learning. In other words, strategists function at every level of defense
policy formulation and joint military planning.
It is critical to understand that by design the Army strategist does not
progress along a set or standardized path. Many may have an initial assignment at Army-level headquarters, but a number begin their careers in the
joint arena. Others progress along more nontraditional career paths, such as
teaching and interagency assignments. They serve as speechwriters, members of commanders’ internal think tanks, or as military assistants to senior
defense officials. Still others will graduate from SAMS and go directly to
positions as division planners. In any number of ways, strategists continue
their professional development, acquiring a broad base of knowledge, while
simultaneously gaining a deep understanding of national defense issues and
processes. Strategists proceed along no set path; rather, they benefit from a
range of experiences that provide a balance of military schools, civilian education, and developmental jobs as they mature.
Common to all developmental career patterns, Army strategists acquire a broad expertise regarding the Army and its enabling systems in support of the joint force. Currently, strategists serve as lead authors for the
Army Campaign Plan, division chiefs of war plans and strategy on the Army
Staff, and chiefs of planning at divisions, corps, theater armies, and Army
service component commands. Strategists typically serve three-year assignments, whether in the joint or Army assignment. This provides ample time
to acquire genuine expertise in a particular region or function and ensures a
semblance of continuity on these ever-changing staffs.
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This expertise underpins the principal contribution these strategists
provide the joint force: They arrive imbued with a culture of planning and
are equipped to apply critical, creative thinking, in addition to leading major
planning efforts. Army strategists serve as joint planning leads in combatant commands and are responsible for the development of theater strategies, theater campaign plans, and contingency planning on behalf of the
combatant commander or subunified commanders. These capabilities and
responsibilities are also true for multinational staffs such as NATO, MultiNational Force-Iraq, Combined Forces Command Korea, or Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.
Finally, expert knowledge of the Army and a sophisticated understanding of joint and multinational arenas strengthen the strategist’s ability
to provide major contributions to the success of the interagency process and
national staffs. Strategists contribute directly to the formulation of the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and numerous classified and unclassified reports for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. They
also serve in a broad range of government agencies. Repeated strategic-level assignments over the course of a career differentiate the strategist from
other officers who may also have experienced an opportunity for advanced
schooling and education. Beyond the expansive military schooling, education, and experiential learning opportunities, one final phase of General Galvin’s developmental model remains: lifelong self-development.
Lifelong Self-Development
Lifelong self-development is the ultimate piece of a strategist’s professional development. Some observers have asserted that good strategists
have innate qualities that cannot be developed through formal learning, asserting that “individuals either have the cognitive skills for strategy or they
do not.”22 Fortunately, this disjunctive simplification misses the mark. The
life of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, one of Eisenhower’s key war planners and author of the comprehensive Victory Plan of 1941, suggests that
the cumulative effect of education, experience, and a curious mind placed
him on firm strategic ground at the outset of World War II. Typical of an
interwar officer, General Wedemeyer attended multiple staff colleges and
overseas assignments, even graduating from Germany’s Kriegsakademie in
1938. Equally as important, he “continued the reading habits established in
his youth . . . . It is to his reading, rather than to external influences, that one
must turn to understand the intellectual preparation that Albert Wedemeyer
brought with him to his job on the General Staff in 1941.”23 His career ex-
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emplifies how education and experience, complemented by lifelong learning, can produce a masterful strategist.
Aside from reading a challenging volume now and then, Army strategists have a number of tools to support lifelong development. Online collaborative Web sites, forums, associations, and conferences all have the
potential to contribute to a strategic education. Formal opportunities are also
available, such as the US Army War College’s Defense Strategy Course, an
online collaborative learning experience and a prerequisite for BSAP. Army
strategists also participate in Seminar XXI, a Washington, D.C., seminar
hosted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology that explores securityrelated issues for defense professionals. Strategists serve as fellows in various think tanks and publish in professional journals.
Where Do Strategists Come From?
Army strategists come from varied backgrounds and educational experiences. They share one common distinction; they are all volunteers. Whether
the decision to become a strategist is made at the year seven Career Field
Designation Board or later in their careers, strategists volunteer to become
a part of the functional specialty. Approximately 20 to 25 officers each year
are required to meet operational demands and continue the sustainment of a
robust professional developmental program. It then becomes the task of the
selection board to discriminate among applicants. Board members analyze
the volunteers’ performance in tactical and operational-level assignments.
The board may also recognize unique educational experiences. It is also interested in candidates who have performed duties reflecting an aptitude for
strategy, for example, division planners; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Fellows; or instructors at the US Military Academy. Other candidates compete for the Harvard Strategist Fellowship Program. This program selects
four officers annually to attend Harvard University; upon graduation, they
will serve the remainder of their careers as Army strategists.
Many observers may be surprised to find self-selection as the mechanism for attracting strategic practitioners from the Army’s officer population.
This method capitalizes on a vital characteristic of strategic practitioners—
lifelong self-development and an intellectual fervor that fosters long-term
learning. This is not a foolproof methodology. Some volunteers find that they
have made the wrong decision. These individuals have the option of returning
to their original branches and continuing their service. An effective self-selection process is only the initial challenge in a strategist’s career development.
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Challenges
Officers volunteering as strategists face unique challenges within the institution. They are required to acknowledge an organizational ethos that values
tactical success and command, while at the same time entering a specialty that
initially offered less than assured success for early inductees. Additionally, the
functional area has no dedicated “home.” Indeed, these volunteers may encounter prejudice and a cultural bias in the tactically focused Army.
The Army is a command-centric organization; its core task is to provide sustained landpower to joint force commanders in pursuit of the nation’s interests. Its credentials are its soldiers. Its leaders are selected on the
basis of demonstrated tactical and operational success, and rightly so. Incorporating strategists into this institution who have not successfully commanded at battalion or higher is a challenging proposition.
Even as individual strategists establish personal relationships with
senior leaders, there are still those who remain resistant to the abilities of
noncommand-track specialty officers. Recalling General Chilcoat’s model,
the Army seeks strategic leaders, but the FA59 functional area provides strategic practitioners. Indeed, creating expert practitioners requires time. The
long road of repeated strategic assignments, combined with multiple educational opportunities, leads to officers imbued with a strategic perspective.
Yet some view opportunities vital in the education of strategists as squandered resources for an officer who will not command at the senior level or
rise to general officer. Such controversy only serves to weaken the institution. We are fortunate to foster and recognize both command excellence and
staff expertise in our Army. One would anticipate that this tension would recede in time as senior leaders come to appreciate, interact with, and mentor
strategic practitioners. Building a new functional expertise in a 234-year-old
institution has many challenges.
As one of the most recent additions to the Army officer career fields,
it should not be surprising that the initial development of strategists was
ill-defined. Creating a recognized functional area meant some officers became strategists as colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors, often without
the benefit of transition courses that candidates enjoy today. So the new
functional area is enduring dissimilar development for inductees, causing
a degraded sense of identity and commonality. This problem has been alleviated to a degree by the expansion of the BSAP course, which can now
accommodate each new cohort during this transition. It will take time, however, to incorporate the strategists who became 59As early in the process
and missed this course. As evidence of the area’s newness, not one of the
180 graduates of the six-year-old BSAP course has yet risen to the rank of
16
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The reality is that Army strategists now serve in
every major joint force and Army command.
colonel in the Regular Army, despite the fact FA59 has nearly 50 colonels
serving today. These early-transfer officers bring special skills and experience but often lack a common identity with other strategists. Likewise, 2009
was the first year that BSAP graduates attended senior service colleges and
fellowships. In time, all strategists will share a common BSAP experience,
strengthening their commonality and collective identity as individuals rise
to senior positions. But BSAP alone cannot establish the functional area’s
collective identity.
The Army has long maintained general and specialty branch developers to oversee the training, development, and critical skills necessary to
perform key functions. The current sponsor or proponent for FA59 is the
Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7. Despite the generous efforts and support of key general officers, it is easy to understand how the long-term development of 400 officers can be lost in the din of an army of 1.1 million
soldiers fighting a global war. Some have suggested that co-locating the development and proponency of the branch with other strategic centers of excellence, such as the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, and
Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, would
provide a more appropriate and attentive environment for development and
management of the career field. These issues are presently under review. In
the meantime, a number of strategists have expressed regret at not having a
strategic home dedicated to their development. Despite these challenges, the
value of the Army’s investment in FA59 personnel, education, and training
is beginning to bear fruit.
Opportunities
The demand for Army strategists continues to increase. Along with
the addition of strategists at division level and increased authorizations at
theater armies and combatant commands, other government agencies have
realized the value of these strategists. Interagency demand for strategists
currently exceeds Army supply; the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Homeland Security are actively seeking strategists to enhance their planning capabilities. As it matures, the career field is conducting a continual
assessment to recognize and support these emerging opportunities, while
validating which of these billets should be supported.
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Another important milestone recently occurred. The August 2009
brigadier general board selected an Army strategist for the first time. This
general officer has been designated for a key position on the Joint Staff. It
appears that both the Army and the joint force are recognizing the value of
strategic practitioners. This officer performed multiple assignments in the
Army and joint force at echelons above corps. He is a graduate of several
military schools and served as a senior service college fellow. His development exemplifies General Galvin’s model.
Conclusion
If Barry Watts is correct in his assertion that the United States has experienced a long decline in strategic competence since the late 1960s, then
we are ten years into a reversal of that trend.24 Creating military strategists
and providing the education and operational experience necessary to gain
credibility and acceptance will surely benefit the nation, as strategists increasingly serve in direct support of strategic leaders. The Army has already
dedicated significant resources to develop this capability. As the first BSAP
graduates attend senior service colleges, as the first Army strategist is promoted to brigadier general, and as more than 400 other Army strategists serve
the joint force in an array of assignments, we should recall General Galvin’s
model for creating strategists. The key to success is balanced military and civilian educational opportunities, complemented with increasingly important
strategic experiences throughout the officer’s career. This process yields officers uniquely capable of understanding and operating in the military and
policy domains and capable of better serving uniformed and civilian strategic
leaders; in other words, strategically competent defense professionals. Few
would advocate creating an accelerated path to division command, which
typically requires 25 years. Why would we suggest or expect any less for our
military strategists? General Galvin’s poignant advice still resonates:
We can never predict who will be in the key positions of strategy formulation and execution in a time of crisis, and we cannot expect to
be able to create “instant military strategists” in time of war. In order
to have the ability to expand, we need a structure . . . in which at any
one time there are officers at all levels experiencing a maturation of
their talents as strategists. We need young strategists because we need
senior strategists, and we need a lot because when the time comes we
need enough.25

The unique skills and competencies of Army strategists enable officers to apply fully developed strategic perspectives in support of national
and unified staffs and commanders. That Generals Galvin and Chilcoat’s
initial attempts at describing and creating strategists have finally been rec18
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ognized and resourced is testimony to their foresight and vision. Now, the
responsibility to capitalize on that vision and rebuild America’s strategic
competence is ours.
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